Rugova

A word of warning – this is long, so I will employ the ‘More’ feature. I recommend using the second link.

I haven’t really been keeping up to date with what’s happening in Kosovo. I’m writing this offline and, having just gone through my downloaded headlines, I’ve seen from CNN – Kosovo mourns for President Rugova and from the BBC – Kosovo mourns leader’s death. Once I get online to follow and read those links, I’m sure they’ll be much more useful for your reading than what follows. At least I know the BBC has a lot of links to very good background information about Kosovo.

When I was more involved in the international relations aspect of my degree (haven’t done any IR for two semesters) I had started to focus on the Balkans, particularly the rocky relationship between Serbia and Kosovo since 1999. I managed to work the topic into a couple of assignments, including a journalism subject where I analysed, and I use the term lightly, the relationship between Serbian media and the state during the Balkan wars that split the former Yugoslavia in the early 90s. As such I like to think I should attempt to make sense of the meaning of Ibrahim Rugova’s death to Kosovo, no matter how shallow, ill-informed or trite my thoughts turn out to be.

I’ll try and give some background to Kosovo and Serbia as introduction without trivialising the last 800+ years.

Many Serbian Orthodox Christian sites were set up in Kosovo in the 12th century, when the region was the ‘heart’ of the Serbian empire. Some of those sites still remain and are almost sacred to Serb nationalism. In 1389 the Serbs, with the help of Albanians, opposed the Ottoman Turks in the Battle of Kosovo Polje which took place in the geography of what is now Kosovo. The Serbs were beaten and 500 years of Ottoman rule followed where the ethnic and religious balance in the region swung from Serb (orthodox Christian) to Albanian (Muslim). Despite their defeat at the Kosovo Polje, Serbs base their national pride and history on it, depicted as the national foundation myth which establishes the national identity and cultural superiority of the Serb people (Brown, Contemporary Nationalism). Kosovo became part of the Kingdom of Serbia again in 1918 after the end of World War One and the collapse of the Ottoman empire. So when the Kosovar Albanians started to forcefully make their claims for independence the Serbian government, then led and controlled by Slobodan Milosevic who had built his power on the nationalistic sentiment surrounding the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo Polje, said ‘No’. Milosevic had already gone to town against the Croats and done some pretty nasty things, so he wasn’t averse to a bit of violence when the Albanians decided to fight. I say ‘forcefully’ make their claims because while there had been occasions of violence in the 1980s the majority of the Kosovar Albanian struggle for independence had been undertaken peacefully in the political arena.

The Kosovar Albanians formed the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), harassing Serbian police and military, pretty much acting as a guerilla army and often called terrorists as well. Their categorisation was an important distinction to be made because it then informed both Serbs and Kosovar Albanians about the legitimacy of their self-determination, at least in the eyes of the world, and their actions accordingly. A lot of really bad things happened. What brought the situation to the world’s attention was the sight of hundreds of thousands of Kosovar Albanians being forced out of Kosovo and across borders in Macedonia and Albania. Out of a population of approximately 1.5 million, 862,979 ethnic Albanians were expelled from Kosovo and several hundred thousand more displaced internally, making more than 80 percent of the entire population (90 percent of Kosovar Albanians) refugees. I have a Serbian friend who referred to him as “that crazy” when I mentioned Vojislav Seselj’s name, but nationalist Serbian leaders had a lot of backing, and still do. As an example of the sentiment felt toward Kosovar Albanians, when Seselj was Deputy Prime Minister he addressed a rally in Belgrade and when speaking of the NATO bombing said,

We Serbs will suffer casualties. But no Albanians will be left in Kosovo.

So where does Ibrahim Rugova come into this? He was one of the founders of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) in 1989 and was a believer in independence gained through passive resistance. In 1990 the Kosova Assembly declared the sovereignty of the Republic of Kosovo and seceded from Serbia but not Yugoslavia, and in 1991 Rugova was elected its president. Unfortunately there was no such republic. Kosovo was and remains a province of Serbia, although for the last four years Serbia has had little to do with its running. Basically Ibrahim Rugova was the uncommonly non-violent leader of a country full of violent leaders, and so the problem with him now being gone is that a far more radical, anti-Serbian leader is likely to take his place. This is not to say all Kosovar Albanians in positions of authority are violent, but it is a fact that a large number of former Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) commanders and fighters became very politically influential in Kosovo following the forced withdrawal of Serbian troops in June 1999 after NATO bombing. Rugova was the exception. He hadn’t been involved with the KLA. If anything Rugova was despised for his perceived lack of mettle and force in dealing with the Serbian government, even for his willingness to deal with them at all. Several unsuccessful assassination attempts are a testament to his unpopularity with Kosovo Albanian hardliners. He was a peacenik, but it is likely his successor will not be.

Hashim Thaci was the leader of the KLA which almost made him the leader of Kosovo itself, so on entering politics after the disbandment of the KLA he did so with a fair amount of clout. It should be noted the KLA ‘disbandment’ basically meant giving them official recognition and status under a new name, the Kosovo Protection Corps. Even their insignia stayed the same, and Kosovar Serbs rightly mistrusted the protection they might hope to receive.
A leader who demands Kosovo be given immediate independence from Serbia (something the Serbian government has vowed will never be given) could ignite tensions again. These are not tensions that have lain dormant so long. While many civilian Kosovar Serbs fled for fear of retribution after their military compatriots retreated, there are still Serb communities within Kosovo and is not surprising a great deal of anger remains between the two groups. Riots in 2004 and continued violence over the years are a testament to that. If an extremist leader replaces Rugova, the ethnic tensions which have always been there could very quickly turn to deadly violence like they have before.

As I said in one essay…. Heck, I’ll just copy and paste the conclusion to that essay here – less to do with Ibrahim Rugova than with the KLA/KPC/UCK, whatever you want to call them, from whom the next leader of Kosovo will hopefully not come.

While the KLA claims to be the vehicle through which Kosovo has regained its autonomy and progression towards indpendence, it is precisely its own actions that must preclude it, and its former leaders, from taking part in Kosovo’s self-determination. Kosovar Albanians as a group have a right, and legitimate claim, to self-determination. It can be argued they have a right to independence based on the atrocities and hardship they endured under a repressive regime. They had, and continue to have, the right to defend themselves against attacks – physical, economic and psychological. They do not have the right to deny the self-determination of Kosovar Serbs, Roma, Macedonians, Montenegrins or any other minority. They do not have the right to commit atrocities, inflict hardship, or attack – physically, economically, or psychologically – their minority neighbours. It is this aspect of the KLA that nullifies it, theoretically, as a legitimate self-determination movement. It this aspect of the KLA that nullified it, politically, as the legitimate representative of the Kosovar Albanian population. On October 28, 2000, Kosovar Albanians voted overwhelmingly for Ibrahim Rugova’s LDK party. This was seen as a clear message to the KLA-affiliated parties that while they may have fought in a sphere of conflict, their sponsorship of violence and extremism was not viewed favourably by Kosovar Albanians. Hopefully moderates like Ibrahim Rugova will prevail in the future of Kosova politics

And hopefully moderates continue to prevail. I should point out I wrote that essay pretty much overnight and most of it was sketchy at best – the topic being Choose a liberation movement and/or a liberation leader and assess their claims to self-determination.